What if Theory Determines Reality? (Instead of the other way around?)

I was just sitting there, around the fireplace, reading some Berkeley, considering his nutsy (though perfectly coherent) idealist theory. And my mind drifted (as usual) to Cartesian Dualism, thinking, once again, how am I to convince some firm believer of dualism that a Heideggerian Being-in-the-world/mind-is-already-intermixed-with-matter/you-cannot-separate-thought-from-object theory of the subject. Only to realize that this may be impossible. Indeed, precisely because of how long both of us have been thinking about this topic, taking one side or the other, we would be inhabiting two different phenomenal worlds. They say phenomenology calls for us to go “Back to the things themselves!” But the access to things is always mediated by our subjective beliefs (the Heideggerian three Fore-s). Conceivably, when I and the Cartesian try to do phenomenology, of an eidetic reduction of sorts, different things will be left at the end. He (or she, for that matter—but males are much more stupid in this kind of matters) will see that there are really two substances. I will be left with nothing but a being-in-the-world and Dasein with the three-fold temporalities.

In this sense, are we cheating ourselves when we say that we, so long as we throw away all our preconceptions, can access reality? Is not the very way we peel off the veils of appearance, part of the veil itself? Perhaps appearance is just the enigma, the Real? (Like the famous Greek painter, who won the painting competition because his competitor asked him to show him the painting behind the veil, when the veil itself is painted?)

A pathetic conclusion. One that one can only come up with after listening to the 20th repetition of Goldberg Variations’ Aria in the last hour (whilst listening to the humming of Gould).

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